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Abstract
In the context of principal-agent theory risk is largely seen as a source
that causes ine¢ ciencies and lowers incentives and accordingly is not in
the principal￿ s interest. In this paper I compare two di⁄erent designs of a
collective tournament where the output of a team is generated through a
particular two-stage production process. I show within a theoretical tour-
nament framework that risk in terms of chance is bene￿cial from the point
of view of a pro￿t maximizing principal who organizes the tournament. Se-
lecting an agent randomly that has to work at the ￿nal stage after all agents
exerted e⁄ort at the ￿rst stage helps the principal to overcome a trade-o⁄
in incentive provision he faces, when selecting the agent who works at the
￿nal stage before the tournament starts. This trade-o⁄ causes optimal ef-
forts to be lower in a tournament without random selection compared to a
tournament with random selection. As the higher e⁄orts overcompensate
additional wage costs the principal earns higher expected pro￿ts when se-
lecting the agent that has to work at the second stage randomly after the
￿rst stage.
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11 Introduction
Especially in business contexts collective tournaments between teams are orga-
nized to create incentives for the agents to work on a speci￿ed problem in the
organizer￿ s interest.1 For example, Starbucks announced in 2008 to shut down 600
of its underperforming U.S. co⁄ee shops (Oregon Business News 2008). This strat-
egy can be interpreted as an (indirect) tournament between the co⁄ee-shops (as
teams). In announcing to shut down underperforming shops the organizer created
incentives for the employees to focus on his objective of good performance of the
shops through a collective tournament. The well performing shops survive and
hence "win" the tournament, whereas the losers, meaning the underperforming
shops, are shut down. Another example was the strategy of General Motors (GM)
in 1992 when they decided to shut down plants, putting them into head-to-head
competition to see which would survive (Ward￿ s Auto World 1992).
Assuming that the organizer of such a tournament is a pro￿t maximizing prin-
cipal adds his objective of pro￿t maximization. Hence, he wants to create high
incentives at low costs in order to maximize his expected pro￿ts from the tourna-
ment. This assumption directly leads to the question whether the principal as the
organizer can in￿ uence his expected pro￿ts through the design of the tournament.
The aim of this paper is therefore to analyze the in￿ uence of the design of a col-
lective tournament from the point of view of a pro￿t maximizing principal who
organizes the tournament on his expected pro￿ts.
With regard to tournaments between single agents numerous contributions fo-
cus on this question and analyze how the design of a tournament (or contest)
can be in￿ uenced by the organizer who pursues certain maximization objectives.
For example Moldovanu and Sela (2006), Fu and Lu (2008), Clark and Konrad
(2007) and Epstein et al. (2008) analyze how tournament design e⁄ects e⁄orts
exerted by the participants. Demougin and Fluet (2003) focus on the in￿ uence
of inequity-averse agents on the principal￿ s expected pro￿ts in tournaments and
Eriksson (1999) is able to show empirically a positive relation between ￿rm per-
formance and tournament design with respect to the pay structures using a rich
data set on Danish ￿rms.
In contrast, only a small number of studies focuses on collective tournaments
1For analyzes of incentive e⁄ects of tournaments in general see for example Nalebu⁄ and
Stiglitz (1983) Lazear and Rosen (1981) or O￿ Keefe, Viscusi, and Zeckhauser (1984).
2between teams where individual e⁄orts are not veri￿able.2 Drago et al. (1996)
show that ￿rst-best e⁄ort choices of the agents can be implemented in a collective
tournament through an incentive compatible scheme. G￿rtler (2006) introduces
limited liable agents into a tournament between teams and shows that this ag-
gravates the free-rider problem extremely. He also analyses the in￿ uence of sabo-
tage in collective tournaments and ￿nds that sabotage against the weakest team
members always decreases a team￿ s performance more signi￿cantly than sabotage
against the stronger members (G￿rtler 2008).
But with respect to collective tournaments the in￿ uence of tournament design
on its outcome has not yet been studied.
With regard to the business examples mentioned above it is the fundamental
interest of a pro￿t maximizing principal to organize a tournament according to
pro￿t maximization. One dimension of collective tournaments that can easily be
in￿ uenced by the organizer and shows to have substantial impact on the prof-
itability of a tournament from the principal￿ s point of view, is the design of the
production process among the agents. Hence, I will analyze the in￿ uence of the
design of a tournament between two teams, on the expected pro￿ts of a pro￿t
maximizing principal and analyze in addition how the design in￿ uences optimal
e⁄orts and prizes.
As the output of teamwork is predominantly produced successively the produc-
tion process within a team is modeled as a two-stage production process: ￿rstly, all
members in a team work together and prepare a project jointly (preparation stage).
Afterwards, only one of the team members presents or implements the project (im-
plementation stage). The output of a team is therefore generated through e⁄orts
exerted at both stages and the teams are ￿nally ranked according to their joint
output. Furthermore, I assume that the principal￿ s pro￿ts do not only depend on
the performance of the winning team, but of all participating teams. Hence, his
pro￿ts are determined by the sum of output of both teams and the wage costs he
has to pay in terms of the tournament prizes.
One example of such a tournament are case study competitions between teams:3
at the preparation stage a team works together on a given case study while the
￿nal presentation of this joint work is predominantly done by just one of the
2There exist also various studies on group contests but they assume that individual e⁄orts
are veri￿able (see for example Lee (1995) or Nitzan (1991)).
3See for example case study competitions of Deutsche Post World Net, HP, Ernst & Young
or Roden Scholars￿ .
3team members. The winner in this competition is the team that produced the
highest output across both stages. Although only one of the teams is chosen as the
winning-team based on its output, the organizers are typically not only interested
in the output of this winning team. Organizers of case study competitions with an
innovative question, for example, use these competitions to generate new ideas and
solutions for their business. Therefore, they do not only consider the ideas of the
winning team, but the proposals of all teams. Another example are competitions
between teams of interior designers or product designers.
Furthermore, this model can be interpreted as a theoretical analysis of the tour-
nament incentive system for teachers in Israel studied by Lavy (2002). It is often
argued that the teaching process is characterized by team production (see for ex-
ample Eberts et al. 2002, Lazear 2003) which means that the output from teaching
(for example pupils performance in high-school matriculation exams or dropout-
rates, measured on an individual, class or school level) is sequentially generated by
a group of teachers. In general, the teaching-process can be roughly divided into
two di⁄erent parts: ￿rstly, a group of teachers exerts e⁄ort to teach pupils basic
knowledge (preparation stage). Afterwards, only one teacher exerts e⁄ort again
to prepare pupils in a given class for the ￿nal exams. Finally, schools are ranked
according to their output (e.g. pupils performance in high-school matriculation
exams and dropout-rates) and the tournament prizes are paid out. It is obvious
that the organizer does not only care about the output of the winning-team, that
is the ￿best-performing school￿but of all schools because the main purpose of this
incentive system is to improve pupils outcomes in all participating schools in the
pre-determined dimension(s).
Assuming that all members of a team are homogenous and disregarding the
possibility to choose the agent for implementation on the basis of performance at
the preparation stage leaves basically two possibilities to organize the production
across both stages:4 either each agent knows before the tournament starts whether
he has to prepare the project only or whether he is the one that will also have to
implement it ￿nally. Hence, each agent knows exactly when to work before the
tournament starts. I will refer to this scenario as the No-Randomization-Scenario
4In the following I refer to these possibilities as scenarios.
An analysis where performance at the ￿rst stage is used as an indicator for implementation at
the second stage can be found in Kr￿kel and Sch￿ttner (2008) or Ohlendorf and Schmitz (2008).
In this case the principal can save further costs because rents generated at the second stage can
be used to generate indirect incentives at the ￿rst stage.
4(NRS). Another possibility is to introduce some risk through randomization in
the tournament and select the agent for the ￿nal implementation of the project
(randomly) after e⁄orts have been exerted at the preparation stage. In this case
selection is also independent from performance at the preparation stage but an
agent does not know whether he is the one that has to implement the ￿nal project
when exerting e⁄ort at the preparation stage. Accordingly, I refer to this scenario
as the Equal-Randomization-Scenario (ERS) because there exists an equal chance
for all members of a team to be randomly selected for implementation at the
second stage.
In the following both scenarios are analyzed and compared from the point
of view of a pro￿t maximizing organizer of such a tournament between teams.
Therefore, I assume that the principal is the one who organizes the tournament,
sets up its basic structure and decides how to organize the production across both
stages. This analysis is conducted within a tournament setting based on the formal
model introduced by Lazear and Rosen (1981). In contrast to the ￿rm￿ s zero pro￿t
constraint introduced in their model the tournament is evaluated with respect to
its pro￿tability for the principal in this paper. It is additionally assumed that the
participating agents are strictly protected by limited liability, i.e. the principal
cannot extract rents by using negative tournament prizes. Given the applications
and examples above, this is a reasonable assumption. Respective outputs of the
two teams competing in the tournament are generated through e⁄orts exerted by
all members of a team at the production stage and the additional e⁄ort of one of
these members at the implementation stage.
The main ￿nding of this paper is that when introducing risk into a tournament
between teams - through the random selection of the agent for implementation
- the principal￿ s expected pro￿ts are always larger than without this risk. This
result is driven by a trade-o⁄between the incentives for the agents in di⁄erent roles
when they know their roles before the tournament starts, whereas there exists no
such trade-o⁄when the agent for implementation is randomly selected after e⁄orts
have been exerted for preparation. This trade-o⁄occurs because incentives for the
agents in a team are among other things provided through the shares they receive
from the prize ￿nally won. As the prize won by a team has to be shared somehow
between the team members, it is crucial for incentive provision whether the agents
know the division and therefore, how much they can earn before the tournament
starts or not. Because the agents have to share a given pie among each other - the
prize won - their incentives resulting from the particular shares are not independent
5from each other. In the No-Randomization-Scenario incentives resulting from the
shares for the agents in di⁄erent roles work in opposite directions because the
larger the share for one agent, the smaller the remaining for the other one. In the
Equal-Randomization-Scenario, in contrast, the distribution of the prize between
the agents in di⁄erent roles has no direct incentive e⁄ect at the ￿rst stage, because
the agents do not know their role at this point in time. Consequently, the optimal
distribution of prizes as well as the optimal prizes have to balance incentives
working in opposite directions for both agents in the No-Randomization-Scenario
but not in the Equal-Randomization-Scenario. While Drago et al. (1996) assume
that prizes are divided equally among all members of a team, it is shown in this
paper, that this sharing rule is not optimal from the point of view of the pro￿t
maximizing principal. Moreover, the optimal division of prizes among the agents
varies between both scenarios.
In showing that the pro￿t maximizing principal bene￿ts from the introduction
of risk this paper highlights a new aspect related to the vast literature focusing
on the relationship between risk and incentives. While the existing empirical and
theoretical literature focuses on the relationship between (exogenous) risk and
incentives in individual incentive schemes and ￿nds mixed results with respect to
the direction of the relationship,5 this paper contributes to this strand of literature
by analyzing the in￿ uence of (endogenous) risk on team incentives in tournaments.
On the one hand it is shown that endogenously imposing risk on the agents leads
to higher wage costs for the principal in terms of higher optimal tournament prizes
(compared to a situation without this risk). On the other hand the introduction of
risk leads to higher optimal e⁄orts exerted by the agents. Thus, the (additional)
risk has a positive as well as a negative impact on the principal￿ s pro￿t. This paper
shows that the positive e⁄ect of higher optimal e⁄orts dominates the negative e⁄ect
of increased optimal prizes. Consequently, the (additional) risk is in the principal￿ s
interest.
The theoretical model is introduced in the following section. Section 3 presents
the analysis and results of the model. While optimal e⁄orts for both scenarios
are derived and compared in section 3.1 the optimal tournament contracts are
derived and analyzed in section 3.2. Further extensions of the model are discussed
5An overview about the ￿ndings of numerous empirical studies can be found in Prendergast
(2002). Di⁄erent explanations for a positive relationship between risk and incentives can be
found in Baker and Jorgensen (2003), Prendergast (2000, 2002) and Wright (2004) for example.
6in section 4. The ￿nal section of this paper concludes.
2 The model
Consider two teams (k = A, B) that consist of two risk-neutral and ex-ante ho-
mogeneous agents (r = 1;2) each - in the following the indices 1 and 2 denote the
possible roles the agents can take, not their identities - and a risk-neutral prin-
cipal, who o⁄ers a tournament contract to the agents. Output of both teams is








r +"k; where hk
r ￿ 0 is the e⁄ort exerted by an individ-
ual in role r in team k at the ￿rst stage (preparation stage). ek
r ￿ 0 is the e⁄ort
exerted by an individual in role r in team k at the second stage (implementation
stage). "k is an exogenous noise term in the tournament in the production of team
k. Both "A and "B are assumed to be stochastically independent and identically
distributed. Let G(￿) denote the cumulative distribution function of the composed
random variable "B ￿"A and g(￿) its density function, where g(￿) is unimodal with
mode at zero. The ￿nal output yk is equal to the principal￿ s observable but not
veri￿able return. Single e⁄orts exerted by the agents at the di⁄erent stages can￿ t
be observed by the principal. While all agents who are a member of a team exert
e⁄ort simultaneously at the ￿rst stage only one of the team members has to exert
e⁄ort afterwards at the second stage.
The costs of providing e⁄ort for an individual in role r in team k are given by
￿(hk
r) for the ￿rst stage, where ￿(0) = 0; ￿0(0) = 0; ￿0(hk
r) > 0, ￿0(hk
r) is invertible,
￿00(hk
r) > 0 and ￿000(hk
r) > 0 for all hk
r > 0 and for the second stage by c(ek
r), with
c(0) = 0; c0(0) = 0; c0(ek
r) > 0, c0(ek
r) is invertible, c00(ek
r) > 0 and c000(ek
r) > 0 for
all ek
r > 0: Each agent has a reservation utility equal to ￿ u which is normalized
to 0: The teams compete for the monetary tournament prizes wH and wL, where
wH > wL ￿ 0; because the participating agents have no (monetary) resources of
their own (limited liability).
Output is generated across the two-stage production process and the teams are
￿nally ranked according to their output. Afterwards, the tournament prizes are
paid out due to the ￿nal ranks of the teams, e.g. the team that produced the
highest output gets the winner prize wH and the other one the loser prize wL:
In order to fully pay out the prizes at the end of the tournament they have
to be shared somehow between the agents working together in a team. In the
following fr(wj) ￿ 0 denotes the share of the prize wj that gets the agent in
7role r who exerted e⁄ort only at the ￿rst stage (j = H;L). Assuming that the
principal has to pay out the full prize to a team leaves 1 ￿ fr(wj) ￿ 0 to the
agent who provides e⁄ort at both stages.6 The shares of the prizes are the same
for both agents in corresponding roles in both teams and are chosen such that
@fr(wj)
@wj = fr so fr(wj) = frwj, and fr￿[0;1]: Furthermore fr￿w = frwH ￿ frwL
and accordingly (1￿fr)￿w = (1￿fr)wH￿(1￿fr)wL: The tournament prizes and
also the shares received by the agents are known by all agents and the principal
before the tournament starts.
Without loss of generality it is assumed in the following that an agent in role
2 is the one that exerts e⁄ort at both stages, while an agent in role 1 exerts e⁄ort
only at the ￿rst stage. At the beginning of the tournament this de￿nition of the
roles is known by all agents. Thus, f1wj denotes the share of prize j that gets the
agent who exerts e⁄ort only at the ￿rst stage (role 1) and (1 ￿ f1)wj denotes the
share of prize j that gets the agent who exerts e⁄ort at both stages (role 2):
The following scenarios of team production will be analyzed and compared:
Scenario 1: Both agents know in which role they are before the tournament
starts. Therefore, each agent knows if he has to exert e⁄ort only at the ￿rst
stage or at both stages when exerting e⁄ort at the ￿rst stage. I will refer to
this scenario as the No-Randomization-Scenario (nr) in the following.
Scenario 2: The agent that has to exert e⁄ort at the second stage is randomly
chosen after e⁄orts have been exerted by both agents at the ￿rst stage, e.g.
the agents do not know in which role they are when exerting e⁄ort at the
￿rst stage. They get to know their roles and hence who has to exert e⁄ort at
the second stage just before it starts and after they exerted e⁄ort at the ￿rst
stage (there exists an equal chance for all n = 2 team members to be chosen.
Therefore, the probability to be chosen at the second stage is equal to q =
1
n = 1
2)7. I will refer to this scenario as the Equal-Randomization-Scenario
(er).
6Only the sum of payments for both stages together is relevant for incentive provision for
the agent that exerts e⁄ort at both stages. The distribution between stages does not matter.
Therefore, in the following only the sum of payments for this agent is considered and anlyzed.
7It can be shown that it is optimal from the principal￿ s point of view and for given prizes that
their exists an equal probability for both agents to be chosen at the second stage (see appendix).





















All in all, both scenarios di⁄er with regard to the knowledge the principal and
the agents have about the agents￿roles. In the No-Randomization-Scenario the
principal and both agents know in which role they are before the preparation stage.
In the Equal-Randomization-Scenario, however, the agents and the principal get
to know in which role an agent is after all agents exerted e⁄ort at the preparation
stage but before the implementation stage.
3 Analysis
In the following the agents￿e⁄ort decisions as well as the optimal tournament prizes
and shares are derived by backward induction. Furthermore, they are analyzed
and compared for both scenarios from the point of view of a pro￿t maximizing
principal who can in￿ uence the design of the collective tournament up to di⁄erent
degrees. Firstly, both scenarios are compared for exogenously given shares and
prizes. Secondly, the comparison is made for endogenously chosen prizes and
exogenously given shares. Lastly, the decision about the division of the shares
among the agents is also made endogenously by the principal.
3.1 The ￿rst-best solution
In order to interpret the results derived in the subsequent sections it is instructive
to consider brie￿ y the ￿rst-best solution where e⁄orts are directly contractible
as the reference solution. In a ￿rst-best world e⁄orts would be chosen such that
the expected total surplus of the participating principal and agents is maximized.




















First-best e⁄orts are thus characterized by the equality of marginal costs of
e⁄ort and marginal returns of production.
93.2 Optimal e⁄orts
Firstly, the optimal e⁄ort decisions at the second stage are derived where only one
agent has to exert e⁄ort after the prizes and shares have been ￿xed and e⁄orts at
the ￿rst stage have been exerted. Afterwards optimal e⁄orts for both agents at the
￿rst stage are derived. Therefore, optimal e⁄orts at both stages are determined
for given prizes and shares.
3.2.1 No-Randomization-Scenario
Given the compensation scheme (wH;wL) and an exogenous distribution of these
prizes among the participating agents they choose their e⁄ort levels such that
their expected utilities are maximized. The expected utility of an agent in role 2
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The expected utilities for agents in roles 1 and 2 in the corresponding situations
in team B are given accordingly to those for the agents in team A: If a subgame
perfect equilibrium in pure strategies exists, the agents in both teams that are
in corresponding situations will choose identical e⁄orts. Hence, the symmetric
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8The existence of a pure-strategy equilibrium in tournaments is typically not automatically
assured. See for example Lazear and Rosen (1981), page 845 fn.2 or Nalebu⁄and Stiglitz (1983).
To guarantee the existence of a solution, g(￿) is assumed to be su¢ ciently ￿ at and c(e) and ￿(h)
have to be "su¢ ciently convex" for the objective functions to be concave.
10Leading to optimal e⁄ort decisions according to
c








0￿1 (f1￿wg(0)) := h
￿
1 (3)
As in standard tournaments (see for example Lazear and Rosen 1982 or Nalebu⁄
and Stiglitz 1983) e⁄orts depend positively on the prize spread between the winner
and loser prize and on g(0); which is a measure for the importance of luck in the
tournament (see Lazear 1995). The larger g(0) the smaller the in￿ uence of luck in
the tournament and therefore the larger the amount of e⁄ort exerted. Furthermore,
incentives at both stages are enhanced by ￿ at marginal cost functions. The ￿ atter
these functions the steeper their inverses and the larger the corresponding optimal
e⁄orts.
In addition, e⁄orts depend positively on the shares the agents receive from the
prize won. The e⁄ect of a higher share of the ￿nal prize received by an agent goes
thus in the same direction as the e⁄ect of a higher prize spread. In contrast to
the results of standard tournaments the e⁄ect of an increased prize spread is not
translated one-to-one to individual e⁄orts for (1 ￿ f1) < 1 and f1 < 1:
While higher incentives generated through an increased prize spread cause di-
rect costs for the principal, because this means to enlarge the pie for the agents,9
incentives generated through increased shares cause no direct costs for the prin-
cipal, because they are generated through the distribution of a given pie. Never-
theless, it is important to note that incentives generated through the shares cause
indirect costs. A change in the shares received by one agent automatically causes
a converse e⁄ect on the shares awarded to the other agent: increasing the share
for the agent in role 2 (1￿f1) automatically lowers the share received by the agent
in role 1 (f1) and vice versa. Hence, higher incentives generated through a larger
share for one agent come at the cost of lower incentives for the other agent.
From (1) and (2) it can be seen that it is the total share an agent in role 2
receives in the tournament that matters for the amounts of e⁄ort exerted at both
stages. It does not matter for incentive provision if particular shares are explicitly
attached to one of the two stages. Even if an agent in role 2 knew that he would
not get any money for e⁄ort exertion at one of the two stages he has an incentive to
exert e⁄ort also at this stage because this increases his probability of winning the
9Assuming that he can not just lower the loser prize but has to increase the winner prize.
11tournament. Consequently, it is the total share he receives that creates incentives
at both stages simultaneously.
3.2.2 Equal-Randomization-Scenario
This scenario is solved in the same way by backward induction as the No-Randomization-
Scenario. In contrast to the No-Randomization-Scenario, where the agents in dif-
ferent roles have di⁄erent expected utilities at the beginning of the tournament,
they have the same expected utility in this scenario at the beginning of the tourna-
ment. This is due to the fact that both agents do not know their role at this point
in time and therefore face the same situation at the beginning of the tournament.














Assuming the existence of an equilibrium in pure strategies and an equal chance
for both members to be in role 2 (that is q = 1
2); it will be described by the
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which yields the following optimality conditions for e⁄ort provision:
c













The condition for e⁄ort provision at the second stage is exactly the same as
in the No-Randomization-Scenario. In both scenarios the agents that have to
exert e⁄ort at the second stage again are in corresponding situations: e⁄orts have
already been exerted at the ￿rst stage and at the beginning of the second stage
they know that they have to exert e⁄ort again.
In contrast to the No-Randomization-Scenario where the conditions for optimal
e⁄ort provision at the ￿rst stage di⁄er for both agents, they are the same for both
agents in this scenario. Up to this point in time both agents are symmetric and
10The expected utilities for agents in team B are given accordingly:
11The conditions and assumptions for the existence of a pure strategy equilibrium in this
scenario are analog to those in the NRS.
12do not know in which role they are. Therefore, the distribution of the prize spread
between the agents in di⁄erent roles has no incentive e⁄ect on the amount of e⁄ort
exerted at this stage. Only (half of) the spread between winner and loser prize is
decisive for the amounts of e⁄ort exerted, as well as g(0):
3.2.3 Comparison of optimal e⁄orts for a given prize spread ￿w




1) to those in the Equal-Randomization-
Scenario (e￿
r and h￿
r) reveals the in￿ uence of the di⁄erent scenarios and the corre-

































It is obvious that the di⁄erence in the design a⁄ects only the amounts of e⁄ort
exerted at the ￿rst but not at the second stage. E⁄orts exerted at the second stage
are exactly the same in both scenarios because agents exerting e⁄ort at the second
stage face exactly the same situation at this stage of the tournament. At the ￿rst
stage individual e⁄orts in the No-Randomization-Scenario can be smaller, larger





[(1 ￿ f1)￿w] ? f1￿w, e.g. for 1
2 ? f1:
Proposition 1 The principal￿ s expected pro￿ts are always higher in the Equal-
Randomization-Scenario than in the No-Randomization-Scenario for given prizes.
Only in the case of equally divided prizes among team-members, that is (1￿f1) =
f1 = 1
2; expected pro￿ts are the same in both scenarios.
Proof. The conditions for optimal e⁄ort provision at the second stage are ex-
actly the same in both scenarios and because of given prizes the corresponding
costs for the principal are the same as well. Consequently, only e⁄orts exerted at






r. Hence, pro￿ts are the same as well. For
1￿f1 6= f1 e⁄orts at the ￿rst stage are given by h￿
1+h￿
2 = ￿0￿1 ((1 ￿ f1)￿wg(0))+
￿0￿1 (f1￿wg(0)) in the No-Randomization-Scenario and by 2h￿
r = 2￿0￿1(1
2￿wg(0))
13in the Equal-Randomization-Scenario. ￿w and g(0) are the same in both sce-
narios and ￿0￿1 is strictly concave hence ￿0￿1(1
2(1 ￿ f1)￿wg(0) + 1
2f1￿wg(0)) >
1
2￿0￿1 ((1 ￿ f1)￿wg(0)) + 1






If prizes are exogenously given and the principal is free to choose between
both scenarios to organize a tournament, he would always choose the Equal-
Randomization-Scenario in order to maximize his expected pro￿ts. While the
costs for the principal are the same in both scenarios, the sum of e⁄orts exerted
in this scenario is always greater than or equal to the sum exerted in the No-
Randomization-Scenario. The decisive factor for this result are the amounts of
e⁄ort exerted at the ￿rst stage in both scenarios, because they vary between both
scenarios, while e⁄orts exerted at the second stage are the same.
In the Equal-Randomization-Scenario the distribution of the prize spread be-
tween the agents has no incentive e⁄ect on e⁄orts exerted at the ￿rst stage, be-
cause the agents do not know in which role they are when exerting e⁄ort at this
stage. Incentives are therefore only generated through the di⁄erence between the
given winner and loser prize at this stage. In contrast, in the No-Randomization-
Scenario incentives are generated through the di⁄erence between the prizes and
also through the shares the agents in di⁄erent roles receive. Therefore, the dis-
tribution of the prize spread matters. But the shares for both agents are not
independent from each other because they have to share a given pie. The larger
the share for one agent the smaller the share for the other. Hence, there exists a
trade-o⁄in the distribution of shares among the agents in the No-Randomization-
Scenario: increasing the share for one agent for given prizes automatically leads to
a lower share for the other agent and therefore lower incentives for e⁄ort provision
for this agent. This trade-o⁄taken together with the convex cost functions causes
lower optimal e⁄orts in the No-Randomization-Scenario for unequal shares than
in the Equal-Randomization-Scenario for a given ￿w. If both agents receive half
of the prize won the amount of e⁄ort exerted at the ￿rst stage is maximized in
the No-Randomization-Scenario and is just equal to the amount exerted in the
Equal-Randomization-Scenario for equal shares.
Comparing these results for both scenarios with the ￿rst-best solution reveals
that the following condition has to be ful￿lled in order to implement ￿rst-best
e⁄orts with and without randomization:






14This means the sum of payments to both agents must be the same irrespective
of whether they provide e⁄ort at both or only at one stage of the production
process in the tournament. Hence, the prize won has to be divided equally. This
result replicates the ￿ndings of Drago et al. (1996). They show that ￿rst best
e⁄orts can be implemented in a team setting where risk-neutral agents chose multi-
dimensional e⁄orts when prizes are divided equally between all members of a team.
E⁄orts exerted at the ￿rst stage in this model can be interpreted as helping e⁄orts
in the sense of Drago et al. Nevertheless, it should be emphasized that agents
in their model are homogenous with respect to the dimensions of e⁄ort exerted
whereas they are heterogenous in this regard in this model because only one out
of two agents exerts e⁄ort twice and the other one only once.
Due to the fact that prizes have to be divided equally to induce ￿rst-best e⁄orts
these e⁄orts are simultaneously exerted by both agents and at both stages once
the appropriate share is chosen for one agent.
3.3 The optimal tournament contract
Given the optimal behavior of the agents in equilibrium in both scenarios (formally
given by equations 1-5) the principal anticipates their behavior and chooses the
optimal tournament prizes to maximize his expected pro￿ts P subject to the agents
incentive and participation constraints and the wealth constraint wL ￿ 0: To be
able to derive explicit solutions for the optimal contract and to compare the results









The agents￿participation constraints in both teams are given by the following
conditions, where PC1 is the participation constraint of an agent in role 1 and
PC2 for an agent in role 2 and ￿ u = 0:12
PC1 : f1wL+ 1
2f1￿w ￿ ￿(h￿
1) ￿ ￿ u
PC2 : [(1 ￿ f1)wL] + 1
2 [(1 ￿ f1)￿w] ￿ c(e￿
2) ￿ ￿(h￿
2) ￿ ￿ u
Due to the assumption that the agents have no (monetary) resources of their
own the principal has to take the limited liability constraint wL ￿ 0 into account.
12Note that the chance of winning/losing is equal to P = G(0) = 1
2 in equilibrium due to the
symmetry of agents and teams.
15It is straightforward to see that wL = 0 has to hold in the optimum.13 Moreover,
the participation constraints can be ignored since the agents can always obtain a
non-negative expected utility by accepting the contract and choosing zero e⁄orts.
















Due to the assumption that the cost functions are the same at both stages the
optimal amounts of e⁄ort exerted by an agent in role 2 are the same at both stages.






2)] ￿ wH, that means he chooses the optimal wH to












which yields the following optimality conditions:









^ h2 = g(0)
h









(1 ￿ f1)f1 + f1
i
(11)
^ e2 = g(0)
h





Obviously, g(0) ￿as a measure for the importance of luck in the tournament
￿has a positive impact on optimal e⁄orts as well as the optimal winner prize.
The larger g(0) and hence the smaller the in￿ uence of luck, the larger the optimal
amounts of e⁄orts exerted and the larger the optimal prize. The last e⁄ect is
thereby driven by the ￿rst one: the smaller the in￿ uence of luck the larger the
amounts of e⁄ort exerted, because they are the decisive factor in the determination
of the winner and loser in the tournament. To compensate the agents for the
higher e⁄ort costs caused by higher e⁄orts, the optimal prize has also to increase
the smaller the in￿ uence of luck.
13If the principal chooses wL > 0; then he could reduce wL and wH by the same amount,
induce still optimal e⁄orts and therefore lower his costs.
16However, the in￿ uence of f1 on optimal e⁄orts and the optimal prize is am-
biguous. While ^ wH, ^ h2 and ^ e2 increase for small values of f1 and decrease for
values larger than a certain cuto⁄, ^ h1 increases up to a certain certain value of
f1 and decreases only for large values.14 ^ h2 and ^ e2 increase for small values of
f1 because this means by implication larger values of (1 ￿ f1) and hence a larger
share of the prize for the agent in role 2: The reverse argumentation holds for the
agent in role 1 and accordingly for ^ h1: The in￿ uence of f1 on the optimal winner
prize is ambiguous, because ^ wH is chosen such that it is optimal for agents in both
roles, that means, that it has to balance the positive/negative e⁄ects of f1 and
(1 ￿ f1) on the agents￿incentives in the di⁄erent roles. This ambiguous e⁄ect on
the optimal prize is carried over to optimal e⁄orts and causes the ambiguous e⁄ect
of f1 on ^ h1; ^ h2 and ^ e2 (i.e. that ^ h2 and ^ e2 increase for small values and decrease
for large and the reversed e⁄ects on ^ h1). Therefore, the ambiguous e⁄ect of f1 on
optimal e⁄orts and ^ wH re￿ ects the trade-o⁄ the principal faces when providing
incentives in this scenario. The incentives for both agents are interrelated because
both have to share a pie - the tournament prize - among each other. Furthermore,
the incentives for one agent conversely a⁄ect those of the other agent. Due to
the structure of the production function and cost functions it is optimal for the
principal to set incentives for both agents to exert e⁄ort. Consequently, he has to
trade o⁄ the incentives for one agent against that for the other.
Given the optimality conditions for e⁄ort provision and the prize the principal￿ s
expected pro￿t in the optimum is given by
Pnr = 2E
h
y(^ e2;^ h1;^ h2)
i
￿ ^ wH = g(0)(4￿3f1+4
p
(1 ￿ f1)f1) > 0 for f1 ￿ 1 (13)
He always makes positive pro￿ts in the optimum, no matter how the shares are
chosen. If the principal is free to choose the shares, he will do this in order to









@f1 7 0 there exists an interior solution for the maximization problem
of the principal and his expected pro￿ts are maximized for ^ f1 = 1
5. This value is
equal to the exact cuto⁄-value of f1 for ^ wH. Up to this point ^ wH increases in f1
and afterwards decreases. Hence, it is exactly the point at which the incentives
for an agent in role 1 are optimally traded o⁄ against that of an agent in role 2:



















17In order to further interpret this result it is important to note that this exact
value of ^ f1 does not only depend on the general characteristics of this scenario,
but also on the assumptions on the cost and production functions. Therefore,
it is instructive to analyze the range of the optimal f1; namely, that 0 < ^ f1 <
1
2 , ^ f1 <
￿
1 ￿ ^ f1
￿
: Hence, the prize is unevenly divided in the optimum and
the agent that exerts e⁄ort at both stages receives a larger share. This result
is intuitively plausible: while f1 generates incentives directly only at one stage,
(1 ￿ f1) generates incentives directly at both stages. Furthermore, it is optimal
to choose f1 larger than zero because it has a direct incentive e⁄ect on the e⁄ort
exerted by the agent in role 1 at the ￿rst stage. As the cost functions for both
agents are assumed to be convex and the same at the ￿rst stage, it is optimal
to set incentives for both agents to exert e⁄ort at this stage. But the incentives
for an agent in role 1 come at the cost of lower incentives for an agent in role 2
at the ￿rst and second stage, because the larger f1 the smaller (1 ￿ f1): Thus,
f1 < (1 ￿ f1):
3.3.2 Equal-Randomization-Scenario
Due to the symmetry of the agents at the beginning of the tournament the par-
ticipation constraints are the same for both agents in both teams at this point in
time and are given by PCr:
PCr : 1
2 (1 ￿ f1)wL + 1
2f1wL + 1




r) ￿ ￿ u
As argued above wL = 0 in the optimum and the participation constraints can



































which yields the following solutions:


















~ er = g(0)
￿p
2(1 ￿ f1) + (1 ￿ f1)
￿
(16)
The in￿ uence of g(0) on optimal e⁄orts and the prize is positive as it is in the
No-Randomization-Scenario for the same reason. In contrast to the ambiguous
e⁄ect of f1 on optimal e⁄orts and the optimal prize in the No-Randomization-
Scenario, its e⁄ect on these variables is uniformly negative in this scenario. All
these variables decrease in f1 because f1 has no direct incentive e⁄ect for e⁄ort
provision in this scenario but a higher value of f1 means a lower value of (1 ￿
f1). This share, in contrast, has a direct and positive incentive e⁄ect on e⁄orts.
Consequently, ~ wH decreases in f1 that means increases in (1 ￿ f1) to compensate
the agents for higher e⁄ort costs. The negative e⁄ect of f1 on the optimal prize is
carried over to ~ hr. As shown above (equation 6) optimal e⁄orts at the ￿rst stage
are independent from the distribution of shares for given prizes. As the prize is
now set optimally from the principal￿ s point of view ~ hr also depends negatively on
f1:





￿ ~ wH = g(0)(3 + 2
p
2(1 ￿ f1) ￿ f1) > 0 for f1 ￿ 1 (17)
Because @Per
@f1 < 0 there exists no interior solution for the maximization problem
of the principal and his pro￿ts are maximized for ~ f1 ! 0.15 This result is very
intuitive and is driven by the fact that f1 has a negative incentive e⁄ect on e⁄orts
exerted at both stages. At the ￿rst stage the distribution of the prize between both
agents doesn￿ t have a direct incentive e⁄ect, because the agents do not know their
roles and there exists an equal probability to be in each role. Hence, they do not
care about the division of the prize at this point in time. The division in￿ uences
optimal e⁄orts only indirectly at the ￿rst stage through the optimal prize which
decreases in f1. Therefore, also optimal e⁄orts at the ￿rst stage decrease in f1:
At the second stage incentives result from (1 ￿ f1): Therefore, the higher f1 the
lower the incentives at the second stage and therefore the smaller the amounts of
e⁄ort exerted at this stage. This means that f1 is like a "cost" for the principal.
But the principal does not bene￿t from "paying this cost", which means setting
f1 larger than zero. This does not create any additional incentives but lowers
equilibrium e⁄orts by lowering (1 ￿ f1): Hence the principal would always set f1
as close as possible to zero if he is free to decide about the shares for the agents.
15As corner solutions are not excluded the principal would optimally choose ~ f1 = 0:
193.3.3 Comparison of results
In the following the results of both scenarios are compared on the one hand for a
exogenously given shares and on the other hand for optimally chosen shares from
the point of view of the pro￿t maximizing principal.
For exogenously given shares
The principal may not have the possibility to decide about the division of
the prize among the agents but he may be free to choose between the Equal-
Randomization-Scenario and the No-Randomization-Scenario when organizing a
tournament. Therefore, it is instructive to compare both scenarios with respect
to optimal e⁄orts and prizes for an exogenously given distribution of the prize
among the agents which is the same in both scenarios. This analysis leads to the
following proposition:
Proposition 2 The amounts of e⁄ort exerted at both stages together and sepa-
rately are always greater in the Equal-Randomization-Scenario than or equal to the
amounts of e⁄ort exerted in the No-Randomization-Scenario. Individual e⁄orts at
the ￿rst stage can be larger, equal or smaller in the Equal-Randomization-Scenario
compared to the No-Randomization-Scenario.
Proof. In the Equal-Randomization-Scenario optimal e⁄orts at the second
stage are always larger than or equal to e⁄orts in the No-Randomization-Scenario.
1. Check equality of ~ e2 and ^ e2 :
g(0)
￿p
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f1) which means ~ e2> ^ e2; hence we need:
(a)
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f1) < 0 which means
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f1 < 1 and (
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f1) which means ~ e2< ^ e2; hence we need
20(a)
p
1 ￿ f1 > 0 ^ (
p




f1) > 0 which has no solution or
(b)
p
1 ￿ f1 < 0 and (
p




f1) < 0 not feasible.
Hence: ~ e2 = ^ e2 if f1 = 1 or f1 = 1






All remaining proofs follow accordingly.
Optimal e⁄orts exerted at the ￿rst stage evolve in opposite directions in the
No-Randomization-Scenario for (1￿f1) 6= f1: the larger f1 the larger the amounts
of e⁄ort exerted by an agent in role 1, but the smaller the amounts exerted by an
agent in role 2 and vice versa. In contrast there is no such e⁄ect in the Equal-
Randomization-Scenario. As it was already shown these converse e⁄ects in the
No-Randomization-Scenario result from the trade-o⁄in incentive provision at the
￿rst stage that is caused by the division of a given pie among both agents. But
this trade-o⁄is not translated one-to-one from the shares received to the amounts
of e⁄ort exerted. This e⁄ect is due to the fact that a change in the share for an
agent in role 2 e⁄ects e⁄orts at both stages, while a change in the share for an
agent in role 1 e⁄ects only e⁄orts exerted at the ￿rst stage.
Proposition 3 The optimal prize is higher in the Equal-Randomization-Scenario
than in the No-Randomization-Scenario for unequally shared prizes. If prizes are
shared equally the optimal prizes are the same in both scenarios.
Proof. If f1 = 1



























it is useful to analyze the di⁄erence-
function of optimal prizes:


























1 ￿ f1 + 2
￿
g(0): w(f1) takes only positive val-
ues for 8f1￿[0;1] (see ￿gure 1 in the appendix) and
@w(f1)
@f1 jf1= 1
2= 0: Hence, the
di⁄erence between the optimal prizes in both scenarios is minimized for f1 = 1
2






As shown above optimal e⁄orts are higher in the Equal-Randomization-Scenario
for unequally shared prizes and hence e⁄ort costs are also higher in this scenario.
Consequently, the optimal prize is higher in order to compensate the agents for
higher e⁄ort costs.
Taking propositions 2 and 3 together makes it clear that on the one hand
higher e⁄orts are exerted in the Equal-Randomization-Scenario in the optimum
21but on the other hand the optimal prize needed to compensate the agents and to
create incentives is also larger in this scenario compared to the No-Randomization-
Scenario. Accordingly, the costs for the principal are also higher.
If the principal is free to choose between both scenarios for an exogenously
given division of prizes among the agents when organizing a tournament he will
choose the scenario that gives him the highest expected pro￿ts.
Proposition 4 There exists a certain value ￿ f1 where expected pro￿ts are the same
for the principal in both scenarios. For f1 6= ￿ f1 expected pro￿ts in the Equal-
Randomization-Scenario always exceed those in the No-Randomization-Scenario.
Proof. If f1 = 1
2 expected pro￿ts are exactly the same in both scenarios
g(0)(3 + 2
p
2(1 ￿ f1) ￿ f1) = g(0)(4 ￿ 3f1 + 4
p
(1 ￿ f1)f1 = 9
2g(0):





the di⁄erence-function d(f1) of expected pro￿ts is analyzed:
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d(f1) takes only positive values for 8f1￿[0;1] (see ￿gure 2 in the appendix) and
@d(f1)
@f1 jf1= 1
2= 0: Hence the di⁄erence between expected pro￿ts in both sce-
narios is minimized for f1 = 1







If f1 = (1 ￿ f1) = 1
2; so the prize is divided equally between both team mem-
bers, it makes no di⁄erence for the principal whether the agents know their roles
before the tournament starts or whether one agent is randomly selected for im-
plementation after the preparation stage with equal probability for both agents to
be chosen. In this case e⁄orts exerted at both stages are exactly the same in both
scenarios and so output is the same as well as the optimal prizes. This result is
due to the fact that incentives at the ￿rst stage in the No-Randomization-Scenario
are in this case equal to those in the Equal-Randomization-Scenario. In dividing
the prize equally the incentive structure of the Equal-Randomization-Scenario is
replicated in the No-Randomization-Scenario.
As shown above for f1 6= (1￿f1) the principals optimal expected pro￿ts are al-
ways larger in the Equal-Randomization-Scenario than in the No-Randomization-
Scenario because the sum of e⁄orts exerted in the ￿rst scenario is always greater
than in the second one and overcompensates the higher costs the principal faces in
the ￿rst scenario. Therefore, it is always more pro￿table for the principal in such
22a tournament situation not to tell the agents in advance about their roles in the
tournament, but to select the agent who ￿nally presents/implements the project
randomly after both agents exerted e⁄ort for preparation. It is important to keep
in mind that these results are derived for risk-neutral agents and are not driven
by any other kind of preferences.
For optimally chosen shares
If the principal is free to chose the division of the prizes between the agents in
both scenarios he will set the shares such that his expected pro￿ts are maximized.
As shown above, he will set ^ f1 = 1
5 in the No-Randomization-Scenario and ~ f1 as
small as possible, that is ~ f1 = 0; in the Equal-Randomization-Scenario.
Comparing these values to those needed to implement ￿rst-best, it becomes
obvious that a pro￿t maximizing principal would not want to implement ￿rst-best
e⁄orts because he would have to divide the prize equally between the participating
agents to reach ￿rst-best. But an equal division is not optimal from his point of
view.
Choosing optimal shares yields the following expected pro￿ts for the principal
in the two scenarios:
^ Pnr = 5g(0)






The principal￿ s optimal expected pro￿ts are in both scenarios linear in g(0),
which is - as noted above - a measure for the importance of luck in the tournament.
The larger g(0) the smaller the in￿ uence of luck in the tournament and the larger
the principal￿ s optimal expected pro￿ts. This e⁄ect is driven by the positive impact
of g(0) on optimal e⁄orts. The smaller the in￿ uence of luck the larger the e⁄orts
exerted by the agents because e⁄orts are the decisive factor in the production and
hence to determine the winner and loser of the tournament.
Due to this ￿nding, a principal would prefer to have only little luck in the pro-
duction in both scenarios. Nevertheless, it is worthwhile to note that at least some
noise is needed in order to guarantee the existence of a pure-strategy equilibrium.
Comparing the values for optimal expected pro￿ts in both scenarios leads to
the following conclusion:
Conclusion 1 With optimally chosen shares and prizes the principal￿ s expected
pro￿ts in the Equal-Randomization-Scenario exceed those in the No-Randomization-
Scenario for g(0) > 0
23Hence, only if luck is the dominant factor in the determination of the ￿nal rank
of the team, both scenarios leave no expected pro￿ts for the principal. Otherwise
the principal￿ s expected pro￿ts are always larger in the Equal-Randomization-
Scenario than in the No-Randomization-Scenario for optimally chosen shares. The
larger g(0) that is to say the smaller the in￿ uence of luck in the tournament, the
larger the expected pro￿ts in the Equal-Randomization-Scenario compared to the
No-Randomization-Scenario.
4 Discussion
4.1 The agents perspective
Having shown that a pro￿t maximizing principal will generally favor the Equal-
Randomization-Scenario compared to the No-Randomization-Scenario leads to
the question whether the same is true for the agents. Analyzing the participation
constraints for the agents in di⁄erent roles in the two scenarios already reveals
that both scenarios are not only di⁄erent from the perspective of the principal
but also for the agents. In the No-Randomization-Scenario expected utilities for
the agents in di⁄erent roles are di⁄erent at the beginning of the tournament.
Nevertheless, they are the same for an agent in a given role during the whole
tournament until the ￿nal ranks of the teams are known. In contrast expected
utilities are the same for both agents in the Equal-Randomization-Scenario at the
beginning of the tournament. But their situation changes at the second stage
when both agents get to know in which role they are and e⁄orts at the ￿rst stage
have already been exerted. From this point in time on the situation is the same
for the agents that are in corresponding roles in both scenarios and hence their
expected utilities are also the same, i.e. di⁄erent for both agents in a team.
But the optimal tournament contract is determined at the beginning of the
tournament and at this point in time the participation constraints for both agents
are the same in the Equal-Randomization-Scenario. As shown above, the principal
will choose ~ f1 = 0 in order to maximize his expected pro￿ts. Hence, the expected
utility for the agent in role 1 ￿after getting to know that he is in this role ￿is
just equal to his cost of e⁄ort exerted at the ￿rst stage and hence negative for
~ h1 > 0: Moreover, it is equal to the rent the agent in this role receives, irrespec-
tive of the ￿nal rank of his team in the tournament. As optimal e⁄orts of an
agent in role 1 are higher in the Equal-Randomization-Scenario than in the No-
24Randomization-Scenario, e⁄orts costs are also higher in the Equal-Randomization-
Scenario. It follows immediately that the rent for an agent in role 1 is larger in
the No-Randomization-Scenario, regardless of the ￿nal rank of his team. Because
of the change in expected utilities ￿conditional on getting to know ones role ￿an
agent in role 1 ultimately incurs a loss even if his team has won the tournament.
Hence, he would never have taken part in the tournament if he knew this before.
Nevertheless, from his point of view it is optimal to exert e⁄ort at the ￿rst stage
because he does not know his role at this point in time. Thus, the chance to be
chosen at the second stage and win the (whole) ￿nal prize creates incentives for
both agents to work at the ￿rst stage. The principal does not have to set extra
incentives ￿as in the No-Randomization-Scenario ￿through the shares the agents
receive. His higher expected pro￿ts in the Equal-Randomization-Scenario come
thus at the cost of the agent that is randomly chosen to be in role 1: As it is only
the agent in role 2 that ultimately wins a prize in the tournament, the optimal
prize has to be su¢ ciently large to create incentives for both agents to exert e⁄ort
at the preparation stage.
For the agent in role 2 the rents are larger in the Equal-Randomization-Scenario
than in the No-Randomization-Scenario if the team wins the tournament. In
contrast, they are less negative for an agent in role 2 in the No-Randomization-
Scenario if the team loses the tournament.
Summing up these ￿ndings reveal that only an agent in role 2 in the winning
team gets a higher rent in the Equal-Randomization-Scenario than in the No-
Randomization-Scenario. For all the remaining cases the agents receive higher/less
negative rents in the No-Randomization-Scenario.
4.2 Heterogenous agents
Up to now it has been assumed that the agents in a team are completely ho-
mogenous. Relaxing this assumption and allowing for some heterogeneity among
the agents with regard to their e⁄ort costs (for e⁄orts exerted at both or just
at one of the stages) fundamentally changes the previous results that the prin-
cipal￿ s expected pro￿ts are always larger or equal for given prizes in the Equal-
Randomization-Scenario.16 The randomization in choosing the agent for imple-
16Examplary the cost functions of one agent can be given as before by c(ek




i ) = 1
3(ek
i )3 and that of the other agent by c￿(hk
i ) = 1
3￿(hk
i )3 and ￿￿(hk
i ) = 1
3￿(hk
i )3 where
0 < ￿ < 1 or ￿ > 1:
25mentation has an ambiguous e⁄ect if the agents￿e⁄ort costs di⁄er. On the one
hand the positive incentive e⁄ect discussed in the previous sections remains. On
the other hand the random selection of the agent for implementation implies the
risk that by chance the ￿ wrong￿agent, e.g. the one with higher e⁄ort costs, is
chosen to exert e⁄ort at both stages. It is very intuitive and can also be easily
shown that an agent with higher/lower e⁄ort costs will optimally exert less/more
e⁄ort compared to the other one. In order to maximize his expected pro￿ts the
principal will optimally choose the agent with lower e⁄ort costs to exert e⁄ort at
both stages in the No-Randomization-Scenario. But as this is not possible in the
Equal-Randomization-Scenario the principal has to take the risk that by chance
the agent with higher e⁄ort costs is chosen for implementation. Consequently his
expected (and ￿nally realized) pro￿ts can be smaller in the Equal-Randomization-
Scenario than in the No-Randomization-Scenario.
It can be shown that ￿for equally divided prizes ￿the principal￿ s expected
pro￿ts are always larger in the No-Randomization-Scenario than in the Equal-
Randomization-Scenario if it is assumed that the agents￿cost functions are di⁄er-













r)3 where ￿ > 1 ￿and the principal chooses
the agent with lower e⁄ort costs for implementation in the No-Randomization-
Scenario.17
5 Conclusion
The introduction of randomization into a tournament between teams with a two-
stage production process generates higher expected pro￿ts for the principal than
a tournament without randomization. The key for this ￿ndings is a trade-o⁄
in incentive provision in the No-Randomization-Scenario which is absent in the
Equal-Randomization-Scenario. This trade-o⁄ occurs because the incentives for
the agents in a team are among other things, provided through the shares they
receive from the prize ￿nally won. This prize is zero-sum and the share one agent
receives isn￿ t independent from the share the other agent receives. Therefore,
incentives are interrelated as well. In the No-Randomization-Scenario - where
agents know their roles before the tournament starts - incentives generated by
17This result holds also if the agents di⁄er only with respect to their cost functions for
implementation and the principal choses the agent with lower e⁄ort costs for implementation in
the No-Randomization-Scenario.
26the shares work in opposite directions for both agents. It is intuitively clear that
the higher the share for one agent the higher his incentives to exert e⁄ort but at
the same time the lower the remaining share for the other agent, and accordingly
his incentives. When selecting the agent for implementation randomly after the
preparation stage the principal can overcome these reverse e⁄ects. As none of
the agents knows his role at the ￿rst stage the shares given to the agents do not
directly in￿ uence incentives at the preparation stage.
An interesting and economically relevant extension of this model would be the
introduction of risk-averse instead of risk-neutral agents. Interpreting risk aversion
as a dislike to come in a situation where one has to present (implementation
stage) a poorly prepared project (preparation stage) should even strengthen the
results derived in this model. The e⁄ort decision of an agent who knows from the
beginning of the tournament that he will not have to present the project ￿nally
isn￿ t a⁄ected by this risk. In contrast, both agents face this risk when working on
the preparation if the agent for presentation is randomly selected. Consequently,
in this case one would expect that these agents will work even harder at the
￿rst stage than risk-neutral agents in order to minimize the risk of presenting an
insu¢ ciently prepared project.
27Appendix
Proof of the optimality of equal-randomization for given prizes:
Assume that the probability for one of the agents in a team to be chosen to
exert e⁄ort at both stages is given by q. Hence, his probability of being in role
1 is 1 ￿ q (q 6= 1 ￿ q): Correspondingly, the probability of the other agent in the
team to be in role 2 is 1 ￿ q and that of being in role 1 is q: Furthermore, it is
assumed that q is known by the principal and the agents before the tournament
starts. Expected utilities of both agents are therefore given by:











Where EU2q denotes the expected utility of the agent who is chosen with prob-
ability q to be in role 2 and EU2(1￿q) denotes the expected utility of the agent that
is chosen to be in role 2 with probability (1 ￿ q): Accordingly, hA
2q (eA
2q) denotes
the e⁄ort at the ￿rst (second) stage of an agent in team A who is chosen with
probability q to be in role 2 and hA
2(1￿q) (eA
2(1￿q)) that of an agent in team A who
is chosen with probability 1 ￿ q to be in role 2.
Assuming the existence of an equilibrium in pure strategies, it will be described
by the following ￿rst order conditions:18
c










0￿1 [((1 ￿ q)(1 ￿ f1) + qf1)￿wg(0)] := h
￿
2(1￿q)
The condition for optimal e⁄ort provision at the second stage is independent
from q and hence the same as in the other scenarios as soon as an agent knows
that he is in role 2.19 In contrast e⁄orts at the ￿rst stage depend on the prob-
abilities to be chosen for the di⁄erent roles. So the amounts of e⁄ort exerted
18The conditions and assumptions for the existence of a pure strategy equilibrium in this case
are analog to those quoted above. The ￿rst order conditions for e⁄ort provision at the second
stage are given on the supposition that an agent know that he is in role 2.
19Before knowing in which role an agent is optimal e⁄orts at the second stage
are given by [q(1 ￿ f1)￿wg(0) + f1(1 ￿ q)￿wg(0)] = c0(e￿
2q) and c0(e￿
2(1￿q)) =
[(1 ￿ q)(1 ￿ f1)￿wg(0) + f1q￿wg(0)]:
28at the ￿rst stage di⁄er for q 6= 1 ￿ q: Assuming again that the cost functions






i)3 leads to the following sum




(q(1 ￿ f1) + (1 ￿ q)f1)￿wg(0) +
p
((1 ￿ q)(1 ￿ f1) + qf1)￿wg(0) where ￿w and g(0) are given. As their values
do not in￿ uence the optimal value of q the following function has to be analyzed:
H(q;f1) =
p
(q(1 ￿ f1) + (1 ￿ q)f1) +
p
((1 ￿ q)(1 ￿ f1) + qf1):
@
@qH(q;f1) = ￿1









f + q ￿ 2fq > 0 and
p
2fq ￿ q ￿ f + 1 > 0 for q;f1 2 (0;1): Hence, H(q;f1) is maximized if q = 1
2
and f1 2 [0;1] or if f1 = 1
2 and q 2 [0;1]: That means, for given prizes the sum
of e⁄orts exerted at the ￿rst stage is maximized if there exists an equal chance
for both agents to be chosen for e⁄ort provision at the second stage. If prizes




The value of g(￿) in￿ uences only the shape of the di⁄erence-functions but neither
their minimum, nor their curvature. Therefore they are displayed for a value of 1:
Figure 1: Di⁄erence in optimal prizes between both scenarios (~ wH ￿ ^ wH)
29Figure 2: Di⁄erence in expected pro￿ts between both scenarios (Per ￿ Pnr)
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